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UTAH SUPREME COURT 
BRIEf 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
C. G. RENSHAW, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
TRACY LOAN & rrRUST COM-
pANY, a corporation, as re-
eeiver for \V ALKER BROTH-
ERS DRY G 0 0 D S COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 5339 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND 
APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
\Valker BPothers Dry Goods, a Utah corporation, 
operated a large retail department store in Salt Lake 
City for nearly two generations. It \Vas oue of the oldest 
and leading- mercantile establishments of the western 
seetion of the United States, aud had been owned by the 
Walker family until November, 1928 (Abstract 47; 
Transeript 53) when E. F. Dreyfous acquired stock con-
trol. .J. R. \Yalker, was elected President and 
(li red or in 190:~ ( Ahs. G9; \Y alker Trans. 30) aud 
occupied those positions even after the eontrol of the 
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corporatio11 passed to Drcyfous (Abs. 7H; \Vnlkcr 'frans. 
38). ]'rom 190::3 io November 1!)28 he was the active 
head of the Lusi11css, but after tltat date, Dreyfous com-
pletely ordered its destinies ( Abt-:. t-JO; \V alker 'frans. 3!)) 
and the plaintiff \V alker, was "only a figure head." 
Following the entry of Dreyfous into the corpora-
tion, the store building of the company in 8alt Lake City 
was remodeled at an expenditure of $:320,000.00 (Abs. 
79; Walker Trans. 39). Finaneial tlifficulties followed 
which resulted in the appointment of Tracy Loan & 'l'rust 
Company, a corporation, as equity receiver for the com-
pany and the properties by the Disb·iet Court of the 
Third Judicial District in and for 8alt Lake County on 
June 25, 1930. The receiver qualified and immediately 
entered into possession of the assets and business of 
the company and for a temporary period e1ontinued the 
operation of the department store business. 
At least twenty-five years prior to the receivership, 
the company <:>stablished a praciiee of encouraging its 
employees to "deposit" their surplus funds or savings 
with the company ( Abs. ;);j; 'rraw-;. 41). These funds 
were repayable on demm1d (Abs. 77; Walker 'frans. 36) 
and the company paid li'jr, interest per annum ( coru-
pouuded semi-annually) ( Abs. 22; Trans. 30). The "de-
posits" vrer'e evidenced by a small Look which simply 
bore the imprint "\Valker Br>others Dry Goods Co." 
(Exhibits A and H). No rules or regulations covering 
the so-called deposits were printed in tlw hook nor is 
there any evidence that ;my regulations ever cxistecl, ex-
3 
cept a general understandiug of the agreement of the 
company. In 1929 these ''deposits'' amounted in total 
to about $4-1,000.00 (Abs. 33; Trans. 41). Iu 1924 they 
amounted to $60,514.55 (Abs. 74; -Walker rrrans. 34). 
]'or yean; the company paid or credited the earned in-
terest ou the respeetive accounts of the employees (Abs. 
49; Trans. 54). rt'he funds were "withdrawable" on de-
mand of au employee (Abs. 22; Trans. 30). (Abs. 77; 
\Valker 'l'rans. 36). 
After Drcyfous acquired control of the business these 
::;o-called '' (leposits '' we1·e reduced hy repayment to the 
"depositors". -When the receiver was appointed the 
total of sueh "deposits" amounted only to $14,688.63, 
(Abs. 45 aud 4G; rrrans. 52). It also appears that the 
eompany employees from time to time reeeived verbal 
assuranc·e from the coutrol accountant of the company 
that their funds on deposit wore "absolutely safe and 
if anything ever happened to the store, they would be 
paid in preference to any one" (Ab:-3. 22; Henshaw Trans. 
30; Ab~:>. 31; Trans. 56). The accountant claims to have 
given these assuranecs to the employees at the instance 
and under the orders of ,J. R -w alkcr, when he 
was manager of the business and that Dreyfous, after he 
became manager, also directed that she inform the em-
ployees to t ht) same effect. ( Abs. 27; Trans. :)5). How-
ever, thrre was no written agreement entered into hy 
tho company erecting any spel·ific trust fund protecting 
these "deposits'' of the employees, nor attempting to 
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make the "deposits" preferred claims m event of m-
solvency of the company. 
The employees "<leposi ted'' tlwir funds from time 
to time and in eaeh book, which was hel<l by the em-
ployee, the amount of the "deposit" was acknowledg·etl. 
Interest credits were shown in like manner in the books 
(Exhibits A and B.) 'I' he funds were received from the 
employees by the company at its regular cashier's win-
dow or were paid to the control aceountant at her desk 
(Abs. 30; Trans. :18 and :39). The "deposits" were never 
ear-marked. (Ahs. 31; '11ram;. 40). 'rhe company main-
tained commer-cial bank aceounts in several of the Salt 
Lake City banks (Abs. :lO; Trans. il9) awl funds of the 
company received. in the operation of its large business 
and the employee ''deposits'' were depol:lited in these 
banks. (Abs. :30; Trans. :39). In making these hauk de-
posits there wai:l no distiuction made as to funds re-
ceived from the empl·oyees on "deposit'' awl the funds 
representing general ineome from lmsi11ess operations. 
(Abs. 29, 30 awl :31; 'rram;. ilH, :m and 40). All woney 
that was received at the store of the <•,ompany was de-
posited \vithout clistind.1ou as to its source. J1Jmployees 
''deposits'' were intermi11gle<l vvith general income and 
deposited (Ahs. :3D, 40 and 41; 'Prans. 47, 48, 4H) in the 
commercial banks. 'rhe obligations of the eompauy were 
paid out of the eornmereial bank deposits of the com-
pany. There 'vas no special ba11k aecou11t l'epresenting-
ouly the fnuds of employees "derJOsite<l" "·itl! thu eOlu-
pany, and when an employee desired io "withdraw" 
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funds from the company, he was paid by check drawn 
on any one of the banking depositories of the company. 
No special bank account wa:,; used for this purpose (Abs. 
41 and 42; Trans. 48 and 4D). There was a complete in-
termingled and confusion of the employee:,; "deposits" 
with ihe general funds of the corporation. (Abs. :34; 
'rrans. 42) (.A-bs. 41; Trans. 48). 
Early iu the ~Walk or administration of the company 
the corporation books showell these employees "tle-
posits" as a liability under the tiile of "On deposit" 
(Abs. 25; Trans. 33). A certified accountant questioued 
the practice as partaking ·of the nature of a banking 
business, whereupou the ledger at·count caption was 
ehanged to "Cash uue Employees." On the balance 
sheets of the company tho amount due the total em-
ployees was always showu as a Jiabil·ity, and it was 11ever 
represented as a trust fund or a preferred elaim (Abs. 
71 ; \valkcr 'rrans. :~2; Abs. :J~); 'r raus. 47). Dming the 
Dreyfous administratiou the practice remained the same, 
except that there was an individualization of the accounts 
insteau of carryiug but one nceount in the general ac-
counting set of the company. (Abs. :38; •:rrans. 45). 
The company, for years, placed its surplus fnuds in 
time certificates of deposits issued and negotiated by 
the commercial banks with wllicl1 it did business. (Abs. 
76; vV alker Trans. :36; Ahs. 48, Trans. ;~4). Wht>u the 
credit balance i11 favor of ilw <·ompauy at a particular 
bank accumulated beyond a ecrtaiu point, a time c<~rti­
ficatc of deposit would be secured (Abs. 32; Trans. 40; 
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Abs. 2(); 'l'raus. +:~) from the hank. 'l'he:,;e time deposit 
certificates were for six or twelve mouths (Abs. ~~(); 
'l'rans. 43), a ud Uwy rep res en ted excess emL'l'geuey fuwh; 
of Uw company (Abs. 2D; 'l'rans. ::W). 'l'hey represented 
at one time a sum greatly i11 excess of the company's 
liability to its employees for ilwir so-called "deposits" 
(Abs. 35; Traus. 43). [u ]~)24 at the time of the compan~· 
audit, the employees "savings accounts" carried a 
lia1)ility of $60,514.55 (Abs. 74; \Valker Trans. :34). 'l'he 
company ha<l time deposits of $42,47().00 (Abs. 7(); Walk-
er Trans. 35) a cashier's elwek of $10,000 and a special 
bank acconut of $17 ,08:-UIG. These 1·epresenied a reserve 
''to take care of any mnergeney '' ( Abs. 77; Walker 
'l'rans. 36). 
In purchasing these time certificates of deposit the 
company did uot car-mark funds received fron1 its em-
ployees as saviugs or "on deposit" al\(l buy a special 
certificate of deposit with :,;m·h funds (Ab:,;. :n; 'l'rans. 
40). 8uch funds went into the eo1npany's ge11eral hank 
aecou11ts indiscrimi11ately, along with other fum1s of the 
eompany (Ahs. :32; Trans. 40), and when the balance at 
any bank <wcurnulated to a point as to permit the pur-
chase of a tinw eertificate, tl10 certificate was acquired. 
(Abs. 3:2; rrrans. 40). 'l'he ecrtifieates carried no in-
llicatiou on their fac.e ihat they were for auy particular 
purpose. At the time of the appointment or the reeeiver, 
no time eertificates iu favor of tlw <·ompauy existed (Ahs. 
;)7; Trans. 44). 'J'hey hnd heeu previous1y cashed and 
the proeeed:,; used by ihe corporation iu its business. 
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'L'he plaintiff, C. G. Renshaw, was a trusted employee 
of the company for 38 years. During all of this period 
of time he maintained a "deposit" account with the com-
pany ( Abs. 50; Trans. 56). At the time of the appoint-
ment of the receiver there was due Renshaw from the 
company on account of ilwse deposits the sum $8,370.52. 
Plaintiff's first cause of action is based on this claim 
(Abs. 45; Trans. 52). 
May Salisbury was also an old and valued employee 
of the company alHl during !Jer long periotl of service 
she also had a "deposit" aeeount with the company (Abs. 
52; Trans. 57). \Vhen the receiver took eharge there was 
due her from the company the sum of $2,852.22 (A~)S. 45; 
Trans. 52). Miss Salisbury, after filing her claim with 
the reeeiver, assigned her claim to plaintiff and it is the 
basis of his seeond cause of action. 
Both Renshaw and Miss Salisbury were personally 
assured from time to time that "you've got nothing to 
worry about, your money is absolutely safe." (Abs. 51; 
Trans. 56 and Abs. 23; Trans. ;n) and that "their money 
was absolutely safe, that they could draw it any time 
* * * and if anything ever happeued to the store, they 
would be paid in prefereneu to any ono." (Abs. 22; 
Trans. 30). These assurances awl statements were made 
by the control acc-ountant of the company who had eharge 
of the employee "Deposits" (Ahs. 22; Tram;. :-ll). The 
aceountant claimed slw did so on tlw orders of Walker 
while he was manager (Abs. 28; Trans. 35) and of Drey-
fous after he became direl'ting head of' the business (Ab:::. 
23; Trans. 31 and 32). 
r:l1 here is uo evidmwe that t>ither Henshaw or Miss 
Salisbury ever reeeive<l any special eou(raet or agree-
ment pertaining to their "<1Pposits." It appcan; that all 
umployeel:l making "<luposits" were treatL•d alike awl 
the arraugemen ts purtai 11 ing to the Renshaw and Salis-
bury aceounts were in all respect1-l the same as those re-
lating to "deposits" of other employees. The fads here--
inabove related as t,o the practiee and arrangements 
governing these employee "deposits" apply ·with espe-
cial force to these tw,o aceounts. 
After appointment of defendant as receiver of Walk-
er Brothers Dry Goods Company, hotl1 Reushaw and 
Salisbury filed their respedive proof:-; of claim:-; with :-;aid 
receiver v\ri thin the time ordered by the Com( ]m ving 
eharge of the reeeiver:-;hip proceedings. 'l1 hey hot h set 
forth in their separate proofs of C'laim that their respec-
tive claims were prcfened and entitled to full paymeut 
before the commou ereditors of' the insolvent eorporatiOII 
were entitled to particpate i11 n diHtrilmtion of the n'-
eeivership asse(H. rrhe defendant receiver refused to 
allow the claims as preferred (•laims, hut approved samu 
as commou claims without prefereJWl'. 'l'hereupou the 
court, iu which the receivership proeeerlings \n>re awl 
are pending, onlered Renshaw awl Salisbur~· to institutu 
and prosecute pleHary adions agaiuHt tile defendant re-
ePiver to <letermim· if a prel'erem·e existed iu thl~ir favor 
whic·h would elltitle tlwuJ io full p<1ymellt of ilwir claims 
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before common creditors of the receivership estate would 
be entitled to participate. Tl1is present action is such 
plenary actiou. In the receivership proceedings the court 
ordered the defendant reeeiver to set up a reserve of cash 
funds of $11,268.33 to protect the creditors of the re-
ceivership estate \Vho are employee "depositors" as 
herein desiguated and deseribed, in the event it was final-
ly determined they were entitled to payment of their 
claims in full. 'J'he court further rlirected the reeeiver t~o 
pay to these creditors elaiming preferenee, the same 
dividends as were paid common creditors as and when 
such dividends were paid, without prejudice as to either 
the receivt~r and creditors claiming prefenmce. The re-
ceiver h1as earried out the order of the <~ourt in all re-
speds. 'J'he reserve fund has been ereaLed and the em-
ploye "cleposit~ors" have been paid dividends in the same 
proportion as common creditor's (Abs. ~0; 'J'rans. Hi). 
The trial court in this adiou found that the assets of 
\Valker Brothers Dry Goods Company are insufficient 
to pay general creditors more than approximately 55/r) 
of the amount of sueh claims allowed hy tlw Receiver 
( F'inding V; Abs. 90; Trans. Hi). 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR AND ARGUMENT 
8pecial Nate-
The Renshaiu claim (first cause of actirm) a11d the 
Salisbury daim (second cause of action) at·e sirnilar in 
all nospeds e:rcept as to (l/JI owtl s t lu'1'C a/ al/(1 it was sf ip-
ulatcd i-n open cou.rt (Abs. 32; 'J.1nms. :J7) ·'that .1vliss Sal-
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isuury woutd testify the same as th:s tuitness (Rensha1c) 
·with reference to h·r deposits." There/on', as a ·n1atter 
of co1tueni.cuce and breuif:l/' this brief treats the situatio•J! 
as if bu.{ o11e cause of action existed. Wherei'CJ' the ·u·orrls 
"plaintijj''' rn- "Rcudw.lf'" arc used they iucludc uoth 
Reushaw a·nrl Salisuury. The two causes of acl'ion must 
stand or fall together, as the facts pertain;11!J to them 
are identical. 
I. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A PREFERENCE OR 
PRIORITY IN THE PAYMENT OF HIS CLAIM BY 
DEFENDANT RECEIVER, BECAUSE (a) THE RE-
LATION BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND WALKER 
BROTHERS DRY GOODS COMPANY WAS ALWAYS 
THAT OF CREDITOR AND DEBTOR; AND (b) THE 
SO-CALLED "DEPOSITS" MADE BY PLAINTIFF 
WITH THE COMPANY DID NOT CREATE A TRUST 
FUND. THEY CREATED AND REMAINED AL-
WAYS A SIMPLE CONTRACT DEBT DUE FROit'I 
THE OOMPANY TO PLAINTIFF. 
Appcllaut's aHsignrrHmts of unor No:-o. 1, 2, :~, 4, 5, G, 
7 (a, b, c, d, e, f and p;), tl (a and c),~) (a and b), 10, 
11, 12, 1:1, 14, 13 (a, b, (', !l. e, f ami g), Hi (a ;:mel c), 17 
(a, b) all(! li-l involve tlte fon~going propositioll. rrhere-
fore, as a ma ttPr of eoHveuiullC'(~ t huy may bu discusse<l 
together. 
Assig11meuts No:-o. 2, ::, 10 and 11 arc dircded agaim;t 
Findings No. 4 of both fir·s1 ami seeonu eauses of a·ctio11, 
which are identical and ore as follows: 
"That ai tlw 1inw of makiug said deposits, 
and throughout the time of plaintiff's employment 
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by said company, the said company :,;olieite<l :,;aid 
plaintiff and other employees to so depo,sit their 
money with said company, and guaranteed :,;aid 
plaintiff and the ·other employees of said company 
that said employees, and particular!~· said plain-
tiff, could draw their money out at any time, to-
gether with interest at the r1ate of G;!c) per annum, 
ealculated semi-annually, and represented and 
stated that their money was always abso-
lutely same and that said employees so de-
positing had a preference over all othn per-
sons and creditors as to the moneys so deposi1(~d 
with said \Valker Brothers Dry Goods Company, 
and that said moneys so deposited would be held 
by said \v;alker Brother's Dry Goods Compan.'i. 
as a trust fund in order to encourage their said 
employees to save their money; that said repre-
sentations on the part of said ~Walker Brothers 
Dry Goods Company, were so made to said plain-
tiff before and during all the time that said plain-
tiff deposited said money with said ~Walker Broth-
ers Dry Go·ods Company, and continued to be 
made until the time of the appointment of the 
defendant as receiver of said \Valker Brothers 
Dry Goods Company, by reason of all of whieh 
the said Walker Brothers Dry Goods Company, 
at the time of the appointment of the defendant 
as such receiver was indebted to said plaintiff in 
the said sum of $8,370.52. '' 
Assignments Nos. 4, 5, 12 'and 13 are direded against 
E'indings No. 5 of both firsi and seeond causes of action, 
which are identi·cal and are as follows: 
"That during all of the time that said plain-
tiff was so deposiJiug mm1e.'· witl1 the SJaid \Valker 
Brothers Dry Goods Compa11y, :,;aid plaintiff lH~­
lieved said representations nnd relied thereon: hy 
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rea::;ou of the relatiou::-;hip ol' said plaiuti IT as nu 
employee of ::-;aid company, sairl plaiu!iff was eu-
1 i!led (o rely upon sue II represeuta!ions and all 
of them and that hy rea~>on of said represen!atiolls 
~>aid plaintiff believed, at the tinw of making ::;nell 
deposits awl throughout !he r·ourse of hi:-; said 
employment awl uu!il tlw time of 1lw appointmrmt 
of the defendant as receiver of said company, that 
his money so deposited with :-;aid eumpuny was 
safe, and that it c0lt1Htituted a prefr'tTed claim 
over all other claims against said \\'alker Broth-
er:'! Dry Goods Company <llld against all,\' awl all 
other claims except those of a similar kiml 
against the defewlmrt as receiver of said \Yalker 
Brothers Dry Good~> Company, aiHl said claim for 
said amount, made by said plaiutiff, eonstitutes 
a first preferred claim agaiust said receiver a,.; 
sueh; that within the time provided by order of 
this court i11 said rer·eivcr,shi'p nwt!cr, sairl plaiu-
tiff rluly presented hit-: said (•laim to !he said rP-
ceiver and claimed a preference over all other 
claims against said rer·r'iVPl' <'X('t~pt 1lto:-;u of a 
similar kind, and that said receiver approvr~d said 
claim agaiust :-;nirl receiver in tlw full <llll0Ull1 
thereof, but ha:-; always refused to approve ~mid 
claim as a pref'enerl elnim, aud said receiver rc~­
fuses to pay said amount as a prcf<~nud claim 
aml n~fnscs (o pay said plnintilT any amount ill 
c~xcess of tlw perl'cutage !hat said rceeivcr will 
pny tlw gcnentl en~ditors of said Walker Broth-
ers Dry Goods Company aml from the nssets of 
said l'Oillpany and frolll the 8Ul11S in the hanrls oJ' 
the receiver, the o:airl rc(~eiver will uot be able to 
pa,\' tlre genera] (']'editors of said \Valker Bro! hers 
Dry GoodH Compauy, more than substantially G5'1{ 
of the amount ol' sueh clailll due suelr <~l'Pdi!ors." 
Assigumcnts Nos. (i, 7 (a, h, l', d, r', f and g), 14 aJI(l 
13 (a, h, c, d, e, f and g) arc directed against :F'imlings 
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No. H of both fin;t and second causes of ac~iion, which are 
identical and are as follows: 
"The said claim of said plaiutiff consiitnkc; 
a preferred elaim against said n~l~t>in~r, and that 
the money deposited by plaintiff, as alleged iu his 
complaint, was depositctl with Ow said ~Walker 
Brothers Dry Goorls Company, a corporation, as 
a trust fund and reecived hy :-;aid company as 
such." 
As to each of ,said Findings (in each cause of action) 
Nos. 4, 5 and 8, the Appellant asserts that (a) the tria] 
court erred in making the Fi11ding as a matter of law; 
and (!J) that the evidence in the case is 1vholly insuf-
ficient to support said li'indings or eiJ.her of them. 
Assignment1s Nos. 1, 9 (a and b), lG (a and c) and 
17 (a and b) attack the trial court's Oondusions of l,a\V 
and .Judgment (in both causes of action) deelaring that 
plaintiff's claim is preferred ami is entitled to priority 
in payment. 
A::;signment No. 18 i:,; direeied against the trial 
court ',s ad.ion in overruling defendant's objection to in-
troduction of cvidenee based on plaintiff's eomplaiut. 
Plaintiff'::; rclati·on to vValker Brothers Dry GooJs 
Company from first to last was that of creditor aud 
debtor. Plaintiff's evideucc fnlls far :,;hort of establish-
ing a trust relationship in reganl to the so-called "de-
po::;its" made by plaintiff with the comrm11~'. In this 
connediou it is interesting to twit• that throughout 
plaintiff's t•a:,;e eonstant reference is marle to ''dl'posits." 
14 
At no point did the plaintiff 110r hi:,; wit1wsses make any 
reference to "trust funds". 'l'lw constant u:,;e of tlli:,; 
term aiHl that of "savings" by iJ1e pla·intiff in l1is ow11 
testimony (Aus. 30 und 31; '11ran:,;. riG and 57) inclieater:,; 
that plaintiff at all times had a definite idem as to what 
he was doing. Uwloubtcdly he recognized in hi:,; trans-
actions with tlle company the same clement:.; as arc in-
volved in "dcposiiiHg" nwncy in a ·savings Lank. It is 
established law thai the legal relation between a deposit-
or and the savings bank whieh takes his morwy j:..; that 
of debtor and creditor. (See authorities cited infra) . 
• Jnst as a saving's depositor loans his Inoney to his sav-
ings bank, the plaintiff Ioaned his funds Lo the company. 
The company borrowed from him as it di<l from uauking 
ins,titutions. 'Phe unsecured banks \Yhich loaned their 
funds to tbe eompany oocupy the same 1wsition as that 
of plaintiff. 
ln order to escape from this situation and place him-
self in the posiiriml of eL~stui qup trust alHl the company 
in that ·Of trustee, plaintiff in bis complaiiJL and evidence 
relies. upou two propositioll'S: 
(a) 'rhat iuusmuch as he was au emplroyee of the 
company, and tlw ndation O'f master and servant existe<l 
between him and the compml.\', it follow:-; that with re-
ganl to his loans to tile company that a fidueiary or con-
fidential relationship al:,;o c•xisted between them; aml 
(b) 'rhat relying upon assurmwes of the company, 
that "our saviugs wa:-; abl'olulely safe, awl if anything 
ever lmppe1wd to the :-;lore we would get our money in 
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prefenmce to any one else" (Ahs. 51; '!'ram;. 37) he 
made the loans to the eompauy aud allowed his savmgs 
to remain loaned to tho company. 
lu other words, he omleavors to nuse a '' coustrue-
ti ve" trust in his favor, with his "doposi ts" cousti tniing 
the trw.;i fund or estate. 
1. "A CONSTRUCTIVE TltUST, OR AS FRI<JQUENTLY 
CALLED, AN INVOLUNTARY TRUST, IS A FICTION 
OF EQUITY, DEVISED TO THE ENDS THAT THE 
EQUITABLE RE'MEDIES AVAILABLE AGAINST A 
CONVENTIONAL FIDUCIARY MAY BE AVAILABLE 
UNDER THE SAMF~ NAME AND PROCESS AGAINST 
ONE WHO THROUGH FRAUD OR MISTAKE OR BY 
ANOTHER MEANS EX MALF_:n<'ICIO ACQUiltES PROP-
ERTY OF ANOTHER." 
Perry ou 'l'rusts (6th :BJditiou) 1GG; 
:3 Pomeroy Equi t_,- .J u risprudt~w·o (4th J1;d.) 
1044; 
(;alifornia Trust Co. v. Cohu, 
300 Pac. (Cal.) 8J:J; 
Chadwick v. Arnold, :::l4 Utah 48, !:J:J Pa<'. G:27: 
Lawley v. HinckonloopPr, :212 Pa'c. 
(Utah) at p. 52D; 
Salina Canyon Coal Co. v. Klemlll, 
76 Utah 372, 290 Pac. 161; 
'l'ooele County Board v. Iladlock, 
11 Pa,c. (2nd) 322. 
From the foregoing authorities it is obvious thai 
fraud is oue of the necessary elements in order to enable 
a court to "raise" a cons truc·tive "trust." 'I' he co uri 
in truth does not "t'l'<'ate" a tmsl: il simply admiuislt'J's 
tmst remedies in its effort to \York out justice. 'fhc' lc•nu 
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"fraud", a::; here use<l, memr::; legal frau<l-not a breach 
of confiderwe or of ethies. 
2. THE ASSURANCES OR "REPRt£SENTATIONS" GIVEN 
BY THE COMPANY TO PLAINTIFF WERE PROMISES 
OF FUTURE PEIU'ORMANCE Olt AS TO FUTURE 
CONDITIONS AND COULD NOT BE FHAUDULENT. 
FOR THEY DID NOT IUWEH TO A PAST OR PRt£SENT 
FACT. 
It is well establi::;lred that legal fraud mn::;t he found-
ed on a misrepresentation of past or 11rcsent facts a11{] 
that prom.isfs as to fnturc acts or conditions camwt form 
a basis of a fraud m· deceit charpe. 
"Hepresentntions made by the president of 
a rnanufa.cturing company 1o an cmployel' in 
solicitiug an aecomodatimr Hott• to temporarily 
take care of the c·ompany's overdraft at the bank, 
that it would be taken up itt a short iinw, that 
the compally had big prospects, and his statement 
on renewal that the business of tlrr <·omrHm.v was 
imprm·ing C\'Pl'Y <1a:> ditl not amomd to false and 
fraudulent repreHentatimr::; of fad." 
IrwinH v. \Voleott, 14~J N. vV. (Mieh.) 10:55, 
18:3 Michigan ~)2; 
Brooks v. Pitts, 100 S. F::. (Ga.) 77G. 
"F'raml eannot he p rediea ted upon rcpresPtd-
ations, however fal::->t', which are of a promissor~· 
character, or having reference to a future inten-
tion of thP party makiitg them, or of possible f'u-
hue fach;, but only upon falsl~ repre::;entations o!' 
any uxi::;ting faet t•itlrer p<lst or prcsL>nt." 
Heeord::; \', Smith, 126 N. FJ. (Indiana) :3:33. 
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"In the law of torts tlw wroug of der·l~it l'Oll-
sists in the false statement by words or comluct 
of present or past maiL•rial fads, a]](l LloL's not 
consist of mere vromises or coujedu res as to fu-
ture acts or events.'' 
Brown v. C. A. Pier<'e Uo., 
118 N. 1£. (Mass.) 266. 
w_l_1hat wl1ich <lefPn<lant sought to prove, if 
it can with propriety be termed a represellta1 ioll 
at all, was a representatioll ! hat :'lomething 
should thereafter be done. Such a represeHhltiou, 
from its natm·e, could not be true or false at till' 
time it \Yas llla<le, and if anything, was a contt'<H'1 
or promise. 'l'he difference h<•tween a representa-
tion that something exists wl1ieh does not, and a 
representation that ROHwtltiug· Rhall be done tlww-
after is obvious.'' 
Knowlton v. Keemw, 11 N. K (MasR.) 127. 
"A statement protuissory in its eharal'ter, 
that one will thereafter Rell goods at a particular 
price or time, will pay money, or do auy similar 
thing, or any assurance as to what thereafter shall 
be done, or as to any futnre eve11t, is not properly 
a representation, but a contract, for the violation 
of which a remed~· is to be sought by action ihen•-
on." 
Dawe v. Morris, 21 N. 1£. (Mass.) ;n:l. 
"In order to -constitute fraud in law, n~pre­
seutntion must he au affirman<·l~ of fact, and llo1 
a mere promise or expn•Rsion ol' opinion or ill-
tenti'on. A promise to perform an ;1et. thong·ll ;\('-
companied at the time with an iuteution not tu 
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perform it, jt; not suelt a repret'leutatiotl a:,; r·nn be 
made the grouud or£ ail adimt for deceit.'' 
Keithlv v. M uiunl Life hts. Co., 
lll N. E. (Ill.) G03; 
l 1'irst Nat'l Bank v. Mar('elle, 
194 N. W. (Minu.) 838; 
Press v. Hair, 1:);3 lll. App. 528; 
Campbell v. l::icm's Coop. dr· Co., 4G Utalt 1. 
(at page 14) 148 Pac. 401; 
Papanikolas v. ~ampsou, 7:3 Utah 404 
at p. 418; 
12 Rulittg Case Law, pp. 2:H and 2:)8. 
The heart of plaintiff's ease is found in the following 
evidcnee. The witnes:,;, Cha:,;e, testified: 
"I told them their mouey waH ahHolutel.'· safe. 
that they could draw it out at any time. "' e pnid 
them six pereeni inten~st twicr~ a yr'ar and if tlwir 
mouey was in for one clay, they p;ot their six per-
cent just the same, aml if anything· e\·er happened 
to the store, they would he paid in preference to 
any one.'' ( Abs. 22; rrrans. i30). 
The plaintiff testifierl: 
"'~ '' ' Mrs. Chas0 alwa~-H mentioned tltat 
our sa\·ingH was nlmolutr~ly HHfc, and if anything 
ever happened t'o the st on~ we~ wonld p;et om· 
money in prcfereuee to an)· one ldHr~, in fact. to-
wards the last, as I walked throug-h the officP, a11<l 
going upstairs I lwrl to go through het· offi,·e 
quite often. an<l T of'tr•n spokP to her about it, slt(' 
sayH: 'You've got uothing to wony <lhout, your 
rnoney is ahHolutely Hafe'." (Abs. 51; Trans. 57). 
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If there were ever promi:,;e~ a:; to future eouditioJh 
or happenings or promises of future performance, thusl' 
statements made to plaintiff bel<mg in ;-;ucb elas;-;ifieatiou. 
In addition, the statement that if anything ever lmp-
pened to the stm·e that plni1diff's funds would be pn~­
ferred over all other daims i::; one purely of law and 1101 
of fact. ("'l'he representation that illl~ vrefenud sto<·k 
would (•ome ahead of everything ~was not one of f'ad, but 
of law." Beverly v. Richard~, 2:38 N. W. (Mi<·lt.) 270). 
And, of .course, .could form no basis for a clung<~ of dceeit. 
A study of plaintiff's evidence makes it apparent 
that Mrs. Chase's stateme11ts to the plaintiff were llltllll~ 
late in this loan trausaetion a]](ljust prior io the reeeiver-
ship (AlJs. 22; Trans. :n aml :t2) aud loug after plaiHtiff 
had madl' the major part of his deposits. (l~xhibit~ A 
and B; Mis8 Salisbury made no "deposit" after March 
12, 1921) although she rel~eived interest nedih; through 
the year8. There is 110 evidence in the reeonl that sueh 
statements (OJ' "'l'espresentations" a;,; UCSlg'mtted by 
plaintiff) were made to plaintiff w lwu he commene<>d lend-
ing· his fuuds to the eompany. In tmth ihe testimony leads 
one to believe that these assura11et>s were made to l1im 
arfter the Dreyfous administ ra ii on eommem·ed and not 
previous to that time. (Abs. :22 and 2:l; Trans. :n ). Al-
lowing these assurances or "repre:,;eutatiolls" t hci r fnll 
fm·ee, no ,constructive tmsi ean be implied from thelll 
beeausc they were 110t false. '!'hey wen• prmnist>s as 1 o 
f'uture performance or ;,;ta1emcn1s as to fnturc l'Onditions 
and no fra uu element is involved in them. 
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3. THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF' WAS AN EMPLOYEE 
OF WALKER BROTHERS DRY GOODS CO. AND BE-
LIEVED THE ASSURANCES OR "I:EPRESENTA-
TlONS" HEGARDING THE INDEBTEDi\ESS DUE HIM 
FROM THE COMPANY CREATED NO COXSTRUCTIVE 
TRUST. 
rrhat one party to a transadion repose:-; faith and 
eonfidence iu tile other party whieh is violated or abused 
is no ground for alljudgiug tlwt a trust relatio11 existeu 
between them. r:l1lwre are additional element:-; which 
must be present before a oonrt of equity is justified in 
l'asting the wrongdoer in i he role of" tru:-;tee ". The usual 
remedies on t11c law sidl~ of i he eourt can be entirely 
emasculated or de::liroyecl if ihe measure i:-; :-;imply wheth-
er the wrongdoer violated a trust. rrlw breach of a ::;imple 
eontrad i :-;, in a11 c~t hi l'a l sense, the a lntse of trust and 
confidmH'l', but no l'Onri has had the lmnlihood to make 
the contral'i hrealwr a "trustee". Althoup;h plaintiil" 
was an c•mployee of the cou!pany and believed the assm·-
aw~es or '' repre::;eniations'' Hwdc• to him that his fnmls 
were safe~ and that lw would he a preferred ereditor if 
t'he eompany became insolvl~ni, there is no basis found in 
these fal·ts whielt operatl' again::;t his plain awl obviou:-; 
status of general ereditor. rl'his status was organic in 
his tram;actions and ndations with the eomrHm.v aml was 
not cl!auged by a:,;surmH·es a::; to his legal status or safety 
of his loan io the corporation. 
"\Vhen• o1w JH'rson c•mploys another as an 
agelli, loans money or sulls property 011 nedit, a 
confidenee ami tru:-;t i::; in1posed, to a greater or 
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less extent, awl yet such transactions lw.vP tWVL'l' 
been regarded by courts as falling· within any re-
cognized claHs of truHlH." 
Weer v. Gaud, tltl J llinois -WO. 
"The various affain; of Iii"<~ in allllos1 c~\-c'ry 
ad between individuals iu tradL' and <·ommPn'c> 
involve the reposing of confideuee or trust iu t>adt 
other, all<l yet it has never been supposud that lw-
cause such a confideuee or trust in 1lw intc~grit~· 
of another has he en extemleLl and abns<.~d, t ltn t 
therefore, a eourt of equity would in all such ca:ws 
assume jurisdiction.'' 
Doyle v. Mmph~·, 22 Illinois :10:2. 
"It is true that uses and trusts an_• a fm·ored 
part of the jurisdiction of thP ehancdlor, and fn•-
quently he will on that ground, deeide in c·asc~s 
where the law may he adequate to give rdil~f. But, 
notwithstanding this admmdl~dgc>d au1hori1~·, it 
<~amwt be extended to every cas<.~ where one ]Hnty 
has trusted another, o1· in other vmnb, piHl'l~ a 
confidence \Vhich has been a'lmsed. If so, uvur~­
ease of bailment, anJ evny im;butel' of ,placing 
chattels, by loans or hire, would lll~ swallowt>d up 
by e~om·ts of equity. Nay, every case where en>dit, 
·was given for debt or Lluty, \\'oul<l soo11 lw dra\\'ll 
into the same vortex.'' 
Ashley's Administrators v. Denlmt, 
1 Litt. (Ky.) t\G. 
"Something- lllOrc thau a trust r<.>po,;pd in 
one is required to make him a 'trustee' al'eording 
to its in tent." 
People ex rd ,Smit!t Y. Commic<simlt>l', 
100 N.Y. ~JG, :J N. K 8G. 
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'' ln almost all of the c•ommereial trammdious 
of the oountry eoufiLlenee is reposed in the punc-
tuality and iu1egrity of ilw debtor, and a violation 
of these is, in a c·onunercial sense, a Jisn~ganl o1 
a trust Bn1 this il-l not the relation spoken of in 
the fin.;t section of tJ1e act.'' 
~Wilson v. Kirby, 1::\1::\ Illiuoit-~ ;J(i(); 
Chapmau v. l<'orsyth, 2 lloward (1J. N.) 202. 
4. THE AGREEMENT TO PAY INTEREST AND THE 
ACTUAL PAYMENT OF INTEREST TO PLAINTIFF ON 
HIS ADVANCES TO THE COMPANY, IS A STRONG 
INDICATION THAT PLAINTIFF AT ALL TIMES WAS 
BUT A COMMON CIUJDITOR OF THE COMPANY. 
'rhe fumlmueutals or the trant-~adions between plain-
tiff and the c·ompany clearly demonstrate that lie loaued 
l!is fund:-; to the company and the c·ompauy borrott'erf the 
:-;anw holll him. 'l1 llL~ compauy agreed to pay him .inten'st 
and did in truth pay tlw interest ( Abs. 22; 'l\·>aus. 30) 
for the u:-;e of his funds. There c·an he no trust relatiml-
ship deduC'ed from thii-i agn~ement to pay intm·est. In 
truth the agreement to pa.Y intL•n•:-;1 (•Of1Jto1e:-; a debt-
not a trust full(!. ''If u /Jiatt fHtys interest /or 111one_z; he 
must {)(' ettlitled to the use of it. Wheit a man locks ttp 
money tchich is tllf.ru.stof to him i11 a box, hr~ does not pay 
interest Oil it". l11 re Hroad J.'l (Jueew; /Jench Division 
740. 'l'he c·ompany lwno\H'd call money from plaintiff. 
"l11fercsf is the tOIIIf)('iiM1fion paid for tfte use of money. 
It is alfo!('ed Oil the .rJrOulld of so/lte r:ontrnct, e;xprcss or 
implied, to pay it., or as daJiW/JCS for tltc brew:h of some 
confm.cf or flu' riolatioJt of sun1c dul.t;''. Arizona l<~a:-;t­
ern H. Co. v. Head, :.!G Arizona :25~), :2:24 Pae. 1057. ''lit-
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ferest is the compeusa.tiou allo1ccd U!J late, or ji:rerl U!J the 
part,ies, j01· the use or forehearance of IIIOne!J, or as dam-
ages for its rLetcntion." 13 R. C. L., ~ee. 1, pa12;e :J. 
rrlw agreement of the eompauy to va.v plaintiff ]11-
terest on his allvarwes to the eolllpauy, plaiul~· slampc: 
the trausadiou as one betwem1 debtor aud erc<litor. Upon 
reeeipt of his funds the company <·ould Jo what it dl~sircd 
with them. It was not to invest them iu a trust fnud !'or 
his benefit and then pay him interest on them. It was 
iutenued that it usc them iu tlw company business anu 
pay him interest for sucl1 usc of hi:-; lllOllcy. 
5. THE VIOLATION OF A CONTHACT DOES NOT OF 
ITS OWN FORCE GIVE RISFl TO A CONSTRUCTIVI<l 
TRUST. THERE MUST BE OTHEH l£Ll£MENTS 
PRESENT BEFORE A COURT WILL CONVF]'RT 
A COVENANT BREAKER INTO A TltUSTEK 
If it be assumecl that the eompauy cntm·cd into a 
fomwl contract with plaintiff at the tirm it firRt bor-
ro\ved his money, wherein it agreed that iu event of iu-
solveney his elaim would be prefened, we ask how muelt 
consideration would be giveu to it as against the rights 
of other creditors who Ioaued their nwJH'Y or sold their 
merchandise to the emnpany? No sueh agreement is re-
lied upon by plaintiff and yet in facl~ of the fad that he 
for years advanced his funds io t lie compau~, and re-
ceived compensation for their use, it is claimed that as-
~mrances or "representations" nwdc long- after the es-
tablishment of the relatiom;hip marh~ ltin1 a 1wlleficiar.' 
under a eoustructi ve tmst. 'rhe difficulties in his cou t l'll-
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tiou are well illusinlted hy the ca:.;e of Blake.v v. Brinson, 
decided by Ute 8upremc Comt of the United 8tatcs on 
May Hi, 1:n~ aml fou11(1 in Vol. 52, Supreme Court Re-
porter 5Hi-Advance Sheet No. 14, ,June 1, 19:32, was an 
adion against the rec~eiYer of a 11atimml bank. VV C quote 
the fads from 1\lr .. Jush·e Stoue's opiuion (this was a 
unanimous dccisiou) : 
"Respondent mai11taim~l1 au i11tcrcst-hearinp; 
savi11gs a'C<'onnt with tlw hank, in which his credit 
hnlanl'e on OetorlJer 14, 1 ~129, was $1 ,9fi1.:n. Short-
ly lwl'ore t !tat datl•, rcspoll<le11t had had coHversa-
tions vvith an offieer of the ba11k, in the course of 
which the latter ::;ignified the willi11gm~:->s of the 
bauk to pme:w.sc $4,000.00 of United States honds 
for responclellt. On October 10, lw stated to rc-
spondeut that the hallk would scud tn Richlllollll 
for the bonds, and asked IJilll to bring- to the lnmk 
on the 14th sud1 amouut, i11 additiou to his ert>dit 
lmhuH·e, <18 vvould he required to pay for tlw bouds. 
On the latter <late re8•pmHlcut drew a <'ltcek for 
$2,100 npou m10ther bm1k, which he c1epositP<l i11 
his savings aceount, thus increasing his deposit 
halauee to $-1-,0ot.:n. 011 ilw 13th, the· :-;ame of-
fi('er of the b<mk informed l'CH'JlOIHh~ut that the 
bouds l1ad been ordered, nud on the 1 ~lth said to 
him, 'L han~ your homl8 ', awl bawled to him a 
charge slip which stated: "rhis is to advise you 
that we~ have this da~r ehargcd your aerount a,; 
follows: 
4,000 l''omth L. L. 411~ 7< Bonds . 
Ace. Int. 
Commission . 
$:3,9GO.OO 
.GO 
4.00 
$:3,964.60 
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On Odober 21, the bauk eharged respollllunt 's 
savings aceoun t on its books with $:),8G4.fi0, and 
ereditcd a lilw atnount as a 'deposit' in a 'lJOnd 
account' appearing on it::; books. The bond ac-
count contained only a daily reeonl of credits in 
the account of dwt•ktl ami depotlih; aml their tohd, 
without ally rdermwe t·o respomlPtll or ally other 
customer of the bank. The nahu·e and purpos'~ 
of the a(•e.ount does not otherwise appear. \¥!tl'll 
the bank closed its doors 011 (ktober :Z(i, it "Was 
discovered that in fad 110 bonds hall been pur-
chased, ordered, m· received for the respondent. 
The Ollly transadimtR had with resped to re-
spondent or lti:::; aec.onnt were the ('·OllVl~r.,;atious 
with the o£fi.cer of tlw bank and tlw entry of the 
debit and cn~dit itcrm; mentioned. 
On these fads, Uw Di.,;t ric! Court eonclnded 
that the bank had re('eivl'U tltl' $il,D64.GO in trust 
for the purpose of purehasi11g the bonds, and 
that, as the fund:,; in tlw hmHls of tit<• n•cein~r ha<l 
been augmented by tlw wrongful l'Olllltting;liHg of 
the trust fund with the otlwr fuu<ltl or the hnnk, 
respondent was entitled to pa.vment itt prpferl'll('t' 
to the general creditors of the hank. 'l'lte Conrl 
of Appeals thong-ht that tlw trnst arose only ou 
tlte 19th, when thr bank stated that reRpoudeut 's 
a'C<~ount had been eharged with tlw pun·hnsl' pricP 
of the bonds, hut rea<'hed Llw same <~onelusion as 
respeds the inc:reasu of tht) fumlR iu lite hawb 
of the receiver and Htl' right of respondent to 
preferential payment. Thu petitioner insists, as 
matter of lav\T, that no trust ever came into <~xis-
tenec as the result of t he~P trausaetio11s. ::·:, =x: 
"It would have been equally competent for 
respondent to have prO\'i<il~d for tltt• purd1ias(• of 
the bonds eitlwr by tlte <·n·aticm of a iruRt of 
funds in the hands <;f tlw bank, to he nsl~d for tltat 
purpose, 01" by estaulislll1l!J a credit to ue debited 
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with the cost of the bonds ll'he11 Jll.tl'(:/iased. But 
ouly if the former was the method arloptetl eould 
respondent, upon the bank's insolveJJ'~'Y aml fail-
ure to pur'clm::w bonds, recover the J'ull(1 or its 
proceeds, i<f trcaeeable, in prel'ere11ce to gmwrnl 
creditors. ' ~, '' r.l'he relationship e:·dahlislwd be-
tween the bauk alHlrespondent by his savings ac-
count was, friOJII its inecptim1, that of debtor and 
the cTecl.it balance of $1,~)Gl.:n in respondent's <:H'-
e.ount on October 14 representer1 the amOtmt of 
the bank's imlebtc<hwss to him .. , ,,, ·· 'I'hc situa-
tion thus <·reated conti1med ·without elwnge until 
tlw Ulth, when tlw hauk's offil·er advised respotH1-
cid that the bonds had heen pureh1ascd. 1f the 
advi,ce was true, as respo111lent llelie,·ed it to be. 
he was then called upou to pay to the bank the 
amount of the pureha:-;e price, and tlte hank pro-
eeeded, with the nssunt of Ute respondent, to 
liquidate the supposed obligation by charging his 
saving:-; aceoullt with t lie PX<H't amount of the 
stated purcltase priee, witlt ini<~n~st and ('Olllllli:-;-
sions added. vV e can find in this method of dis-
elwrging ·a suprwsed obligation 110 ltint of an in-
temled alteration of tlw derbtor and creditor re-
la tio11 ship, with whieh respondent ku l lwt>Jl con-
tent front the bep;iitlliug, to that of tru:-;tee and 
cestui que trust. 
'l'he court below thought t!Jat tlH' l<~g·;d eon-
scqucnee io he attribnte<l to tl1c debiting of tlw 
accmmt with the supposed purclmse price of th<' 
bonds was tlw same as if the respon<ll~llt had 
caslwd a ehel·k for the amount awl lwcl tltcll pro-
eeeded to hand tlH~ monev back to the hank und<'i. 
a spoci fi<· agn~l~lttell t between hi 111 and the bank 
that the money wns to lH' held as a special fund, 
for the sole purpose of eompldinp; the purelmsu. 
'!'his view is not wit !lout :-mpport. 
• • • • • • • * 
27 
8uch a pr·oeeduru, if adually eaniud out, 
might afford a basis, which is lacking here, for Uw 
inferenee that respomh~tll, uo lo11ger eolll<'lll witJ1 
t'hu role of creditor, had sought to establish a 
trust fnnd. But the mere debitillg of }Ji,c; ae·eotull, 
without more, for tlw reimhursenwnt of tl1P bank 
for the obligation which it wns :mppo:-wd to have 
ineurred or paid, lends no support to stwh an in-
ference. The eaneellation of tile eredit lmlatH't' 
by the debit neither suggests any intention to es-
tablish a trust nor points to any identifiable thing· 
which could be the subject of it." 
vYe quote this dceisiou nt lcng;th hl~canse of tlw 
similarity of the legal positions of plaiutiff i11 the ease 
at bar ami of Brinson in the cited cw.;e. They trusted 
their t·espective debto'f's to perform tlwir respe('live al-
le,r;ed agreenwJifs; they depended on their de!Jtors remain-
illfJ solvent until the a,r;reeJf/CIIfs !r-ae ex.ec1ded. The.IJ 
accepted the promises of their debtors awl their a]J-
parent ji1wncial abilities to perform. 
The faet that the plaintiff rdiL·d upon tlw eompany's 
assurance that his fumls were safe and that he was a 
prefened credito:r did not c]wHge tile legal rulati,onsltip 
of the parties ill 1·egarJ to funds loaued by plaintiff. 
Plaintiff had always beeu a ge11eral <·redi1or of the cor-
poration and he so remained. lle was c·o11teut to remain 
in that role and dill not depart from it, and tlte assnr-
an<:c~s he received from Mrs. Chase, as <'ompany repre-
sentative, had no effect on this relaticmship. His c·redit 
balam·e was not pai<11o !tim, <llld hy him retunwd 1o tlw 
eompany on a spe<·ifh: trn::oi so thai partindar fuuds 
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were segregated from thP general funds and assets of the 
company. As fur( her sustaining appellant's position 
there are cited: 
N ortltern 8ugar Corporation v. 'I' hom pson, 
1:3 :B-,ed. (2nd) 829 ; 
Noyes v. Fin;1 Nati,oual Bank, 
167 N.Y. Supple. 288; 
Craig v. Bnuk .of Granby, 210 Mo. App. :3:34; 
-Wetherell v. O'Brie11, 140 Ill. 146; 
Mutual Accident Assn. v. Jacobs, 
141 Ill. 261; 
F'ralick v. Coeur D'Ale11e B. & T. Co., 
3G l(laho 108, 210 Pae. 38G; 
Marim~ Bauk v. :b'ultou Ba11k, 
:2 -\\'all. (U. 8.) 232, 11 Law. Ed. 786; 
Com11wreial Bauk of Penn. v. Armstrong, 
148 U. S. 50, l:l Supt. Ct. ;):t3, 
:~7 L. F~<l. 3G3; 
Minard v. Watts, l8G Fed. 242; 
lj'allgatter v. Watts, 11 J1'e<l. (:2ud) :\8:3; 
Phoenix Bank v. Hi~-duy, 111 tT. S. 123; 
Fidelity As;,;n. v. Hodgers, 180 Cal. G8i3, 
182 Pae. -1-2{); 
Sclrenek Ctwmieal Co. v. Industrial A. awl 
D. Co., 121 N. Y. Supple. t\:38; 
Y O'rkshiru Investment Co. , .. :b'owler, et al., 
78 :B'ed. (C. C. A.) 5f-i; 
Mahle v. Sanel1e, 7~l N. K (Tll.) D; 
Tucker v. Lirner, :'!7 -'\ tlantie (N .• J. 
:BJquity) 1017; 
Heddingt-ou , .. Lanallilll, e( al., 
3~) Maryland 429. 
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G. THAT PART OF FI~DING NO. 4 (Ol•' BOTH CAUS.bJS 
OF ACTION) IfEADING: "SAlD COMPANY * * * IU<J-
PRESENTED AND STATED * * * THAT MONEYS SO 
DEPOSITED WOULD Bh: HJ;jLD BY SAID WALKER 
BROTHERS DRY GOODS COMPANY AS A TRUST 
FUND IN ORDEH TO ENCOUR;\GE THF~IR SAID EM-
PLOYEES TO SAVE MONEY" IS WHOLLY UNSUP-
PORTED BY ANY EVIDENCJ;~ AND TS CLJ;~ARLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
If reference is made to thl~ testimouy .of the witness, 
Chase, (Aibs. 22, 2:3, 24, 2;), 2G, 27; 'I'nms. :m, :n, :~2, 
:3:n; of the plaintiff (Ahs. 50, 51; r:I'rm1s. 55, 5G, 57) and 
the witness, Walker (Abs. 7G, 77; Walker Trans. :3G and 
~37) it will be plainly sec>B that no Hueh state111ent o1· 
representation as !tnoted above in this finding was evc>r 
made to plaintiff or to Mist:~ SalislJmy. At no time was 
there ever any mention of any trust fuJI([ "to encourage> 
their said employees to savce mom',\"." 'l'his clamw is but 
a legal conclusion of com1sel and tlw n~cord is entirely 
silent as to an,\· such representation being made to plain-
tiff or to Miss Salisbury. The follo\Ying eitation is in 
point: 
'"l'his (•omplaint, in t>ffed al1egl~s, ('ll!Jversi.on 
of money b~· defcmlant nnd the fads tlten;ill 
stated utterly fail to hriug Hw case within tlw 
domain of equity, as tlw elenwnts necessary to 
ereato the relation of trnstel' and l'Pstui qm~ trnst 
are not shown to exist. Tnw plai11tiff in his eolll-
plaint designates the mom•y he seeks to re!·over 
al:l a trust fund, but this, however, is only thP eoa-
e]usion of the pleader. The rl'lntions of tlw 
parties to each otlJN, huennsP of and whit·h .u:ro\\. 
oui of the trammetion in qtwstion, mnst bt• deh•r-
mined by the facts, what ilw:· did ill the pn•mises 
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all(! not b~T what the plearlcr choo~t·s to laLd or 
call it in his pleading." 
Francis v. Gishonw, 30 Utah G7, ~n Pae. 571. 
Plaintiff and witness, Chase, prohal>ly did not kll'oW 
what was meant hy a "trust fund" and ill all of their 
testimony thl'.\' rwYer usucl the words" trust fnurl ". T'nis 
dause in :B'ill(1ing 4- (both causes) is taken verbatim from 
paragraph 4 (:both causes) of the eomplaint. In addition 
to Uw fad that th8re is al)solutely no evidcll'ce to support 
it, the clausl~ falls irrto the en·or of attempting to make 
a promise-" that m01w:·s so clepositecl 1\'ould lte held 
'~ '~ ,,, as a trust fund''-for future performauee, do the 
work of a representatiorr of a past or present fad. (Sec 
parngraplr :2 of this section of brief.) 
From the foregoing discussion and authoritie:-; it rs 
submitted: 
l. '!'hat plaintiff's co!llplaint does not state a cause 
of action entitling him to elailll a prefererH·e in the pay-
ment of his c·laim all(! lwm·e defendant's ohjuction to thP 
introduction of eYidt>uce should haYe been sustainerl; 
2. 'l'lrat the evidence shows ilrat plaintiff \\'a:-; at all 
timcl'l a simple coni rad <' redi tor of \Valkcr Br:ot hers 
Dry Goods Comparry, \\'ithout right of prcferenec; 
:L 1'hat uo eon:-;tmctiYe tru~t in favor of plailltif'{' 
cxisb;. 
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II. 
THE FUNDS PAID BY PLAINTIFF TOW ALKER BRO'l'H-
ERS DRY GOODS COMPANY WERE NOT HELD IN 
ANY SPECIAL DEPOSIT OR FUND, BUT WERE IN-
TERMINGLED AND CONFUSED WITH THE IN-
DIVIDUAL OR CORPORATE FUNDS OF THE COM.-
p ANY AND WERE USED IN THE COMPANY BUSI-
NESS. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO TRACE AND IDENTI-
FY THE FUNDS OF PLAINTIFF AS ENTERING 
INTO SOME SPECIFIC PROPERTY, SECURITY OR 
ASSET OF THE INSOLVENT CORPORATION 
WHICH CAME INTO THE HANDS OF THE RE-
CEIVER. HENCE, EVEN IF A TRUST WAS 
CREATED IT MUST FAIL AND PLAINTIFF IS BUT 
A GENERAL CREDITOR. 
Assignments of error 7(h, i, j nnd k), 8 (hand d), 
9 (c, d and c) ancl17 (c, cl and e) involve the above pro-
position of law. 
There is positive evidmwe in i he re(~.onl as to thv 
methods pursued by the company in handling funds 
loanvd to the company hy i·ts emplo~'Pes. 
'rhe employee "deposits" after having beeu received 
hy the compa11y were comming-led indisniminately with 
funds of the compan~· receive(l from its daily sales and 
other sources. (Ahs. :30 awl :n; 'Jlnms. :38 alHl :39). 'rhcse 
company funds were deposited daily in the bankt->, and in 
making up tlll' deposits no distinction as to funds repre-
senting employees' savings alld fuwis representing sn let-> 
were made. 'Phey were all pu( togd!Jer. 'Jllw company 
had no speeial bank al'(•ount in which i lte employees' 
:-;avings \V(~re kept alonP. (Ahs. :n; 'rrans. :3~l; Ahs. :14; 
Trant->. 42). ThL• l'mployees' savings were not ear-
mm·kecl. (A!Js. :32; 'l'nuis. 40). The eomp:my nwilliaillell 
several banking depositories awl whe11 ill<' eredii bal-
ance in fnvor of the <'Olllp<m~· in a particular lHmk woul<l 
reach a certain point, a tinte certifienle of deposit would 
he purchased from such bm1k. (Ahs. 32; 'l'ralls. 40; Ahs. 
:::lG; '!'ralls. 43), but at no time wm; a certificate of de-
posit purchased which l'tmlained mlly the l'uJI(ls of em-
ployees whi<·h had !Jeell paid over to the eompan.L (Abs. 
iU; Renshaw Tram;. 40). 1'hesc e€~rtifiea tes of deposit 
Wl'rc '' l'l1Wl'geucy funds'' alHI we1·e intended to take· eare 
of "anything in all ell'el'gt'llCy." c.\bs. 76; \Valkel' Trans. 
iH"i). 'J'lwn~ \\'l~l'l~ no tinw <·ertifil'atcs of deposit ownell by 
the company 011 <laic of lite appoinimuut of the n~eeiVl'l'. 
They had all heeu ('aslwd prior to that date all<! used in 
the company lm:,;im~ss. ( Abs. ::7; T ntll s. 44). 
"\\'hen it came io making deposits no distinctio1J as 
to fundt-; l'l'lll't~senting employees' savings and funds 
represent iug the sale:-; was made. 'I' he:· wen• all put 
togethe1·." (. \bs. ::o n ud :n ; Tnms. :lH aud :-l!l). 'l'inw 
dcpof>il l'l'rtificates Wl~n· aequired with lm11k nedits, 
whieh l'OlltaiH('d g"l~uernl re<·l'ipls of 1he l'Ompau:· a11d tlH· 
emplo~'l'l' loa 11s. ( Abs. :n ; 'I' raw,;. 40). 
It tcilf {Jc 11oferl t ha1 i11 caclt tllstaJtcc flu; funds rep-
resent i·ng employee luaus ?.cere dcprn;itcd iu com pa1111 
ua11ks. '!'ltere is no euideuce that any other d·ispositio11 
or usc tccrc er<'J' uwde of t!teJJI. 'l'lw oblif,!;aiion~ of the 
l'Ompa uy were paid from the l'Oilllll on hmd at t lw hank-;, 
(·Olttposed of re<'cipls from all BOtll'l'CH. (All~. -!1; 'l'nllls . 
.JB). 
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The legal principle::; involved 111 llw ;-;it11ntion pn·-
1-leilted by the evideuc·e iu tltil-l case camwt lw sulJjeet to 
auy serious dispute. The ::-;upnmw Court of Ctal1 li:1:; 
definitely elucidated the rules of law which govem iii 
this jurisdiction. 'l'he appellant therefore submits l he· 
following authorities, which support its position as sei 
forth above. 
'"l'lw d()(·triue of equity, as regards prOJllH·ty 
disposed of by persow; i11 :1 fidtwiary position, 
is that whether the disposition of it he rig·htful 
or wrongful, the hemdieial 0\\'llUr is entitled to 
the proeeeds, whatever he their form, provided 
only he ean ·identify f hen1.. If they emmot he 
identified, by reason of thu trust mmwy heiug 
mingled with that of the tmstr~e, then Uw cestui 
que trust is entitlerl to a el:argu upon the new 
investment to the exteut oft he trust lllOJWY inH·e-
a·ble into it; that there is no distindiou hutwuPu all 
express trustee and all agc~ut, or bailee, or eol-
ledor of reuts, or anybody elsu in a fiduciary 
positio11, ancl that there is 110 di ffereuee between 
iuvestmeuttJ iu the pun·lwse of lands, or clwttrds, 
or boucltJ, or loans, or lllOnl'_YS lleposited in a hm!lz 
account.'' 
ISir Geo .. Jest>el, Ma~tur of tlw Rolls; quotud 
with approntl ill National Rmk VH. Tn-
wrance Co., 104 tT. S. G8, and adopted 
as the rule in LJtah iu Waddell vs. ~Wad­
dell, ;w Utalt .t:lG; 10.t Par•. 74:l. 
'"l'lw eourt~ ha \'l~ fruq ueutly eo11siden•d and 
pas~ed upo11 claims like the otw hufon~ ns, lm\ 
we know of uo ea~e wlwn• it ha:-; h('l'll lwld that :t 
tru:-;t could Ill~ impn•ssr·d on propPdy or fuud:-; 
where it is ('Om·ecled to lw iutpos~ihle to inLCl' <•r 
34 
ideutify the property or fumls, eit Iter in its orig 
inal or ::;nbstitnted form *' * ·· It was not held 
in the Waddell case (:Hi Utah .,!.;);)) nor iu auy 
other, so far a:-; we are a\\'are, thai a ('Onrt has 
e\·e1· im}Jn~ssml, or has attempted to impress, n 
trust upon l'L'l·iain}H'operty or upuu a certaiu l'und 
where the original trust property or trust fnnd 
ea11 no longer be tnH·ed or identified, eiU1er i11 
its original or suil:.;tituted fonu." 
Kent vs. Km1t, 30 l)tah ±4, Hi3 Pae. ~71, 
15 L. H. A. (N. ~.) 1100. 
''Whenever a trust fund has been wrongful] y 
converted into another specic8 of propert~·, if it:-; 
ideutity ean lll~ traeed, it will be held, in its 1ww 
form, liable to 1lw right::-; of the cestui que trust. 
No clulllge i11 it::; state and fonn enn divest it ol' 
such trust. No long as it l'an he ideutiticll, either 
as the original property ol' the eestui que trust, 
or as tlw produd of it, equity will follow it; and 
the right of reclamation attaches to it uutil de-
taehed by t!Je SUlll~l'iOJ' equity oJ' a boua fide IJUl'-
e!Jaser, for a valuable eo11sicleration, without no-
tice. 'J'he substitute for the original thi11g follo\\',.; 
the nature of the thiug itself ::-;o lollg as it ('<lll lw 
at>certained to be su('h. But the rigl1t of pursuing 
it fails when thp mea!ls of ascurtaimnml! fails. 
'rhis is always tlw l'<t:-lt~ whL~It thu suhjl~l·t matter 
is turned into moJJP,\' alld mixei1 nud eoufouuded 
in a geucral mass of property of the ::-;auw de-
scription.'' 
'rlwmpson 1\ ppeal :2~ Penn. Ntate Hi. 
"A trust en~ditor is not L~utitll'd to a prefer-
C:lH'l' over gmwral (']'editors of the insolvent mere-
ly on the ground of the natnre of his clai111. To 
authori?.l~ sw·lt a prci'l'l'CIH'e, some specific recog-
uiJ~ed l~(luity founded on the relation of the <lcbt 
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to the assets in the hands ol' the a:-:si~uet• or 
receiver, and whi(·!J entitles the• d<lilll<lllt, accord-
ing to equitable principles, to a pn·ferenec~ ill pay-
meut out of tlw:-:c assub, nm:-:t he estahlislwd ll\ 
evidml<'e. rrhe person clailllillt~· to IJp ll trnsj ('1'(··-
ditor lllnst in order to ustalllish his ri~~·llt to :1 
preferem·e, trace the trust money i11to SOltll' spe-
cifie property, fund, securit~·, or :H·<·ount ol' tllL' 
i11solveut whi<·ll has passed into the l!nllds oi' tiH· 
receiver or nssigm~e, ;md tll(' proceed:-: of wllil·l, 
arc to he distributed. lie must ideutil\· tl1c~ fuud 
out of whieh he demands to he prdL~r;·t~d in dis-
tribution ei thcr as the origiwtl trnst prope rt.\· or 
as a product of it ~, * ~, Tlw right to punnw tlw 
fund fails whm1 the nwaus of i<leutii\ing and as-
certaining it fails.'' 
Groff vs. City ~a vings WmHI & ']'rust Co , 
46 Penn. Ruperior Ct. 42:l; 
Lifter vs. F~arl Go., /(i Penn. Superior Ct. 
173; 
Corporation Commissiou v. l\lercllants Bank 
& Co., 1:38 ~. E. 2:3 ( S. C.) 
"The authorities arc generally agreed t I! at 
t.he right of tile <·cstui qnP trust to reclnim trusi 
funds in speci(~, or impress n trust upon other 
property in the hands of the trustee, is founded 
upon ihe right of property amlnot 011 the grounds 
of compensation for its loss, allll heiieC' tl1c henl'-
fieiary of a trn:-;t fund is not entitled, lllerely lw-
eause of the <·haracter of its l'lnilll, to pa~·nll•nts 
out of the insolvent trustN~ ':-: assets in prei'L~I'l'lll'l' 
to general creditors, hut llll!st trace m1d itlc•ntif~· 
the trust funds iu ordl'r to I'l'dailll them * ~, ''' . 
'l'lwre arc, however, wnll-cstallli:-dJed prim·iples 
whieh govern the duties of a eestni qm' 1 rns1, a:-; 
depositor in a hank, \',·ho st•Pk:-: io tract• and n'-
t•laim his fund. lt is wt>ll :-:<•ttll'd thni, wlll'll <l 
trustee vuongfully l'Ollltningles trust fuuds \\·itlt 
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his own funds, l~quity will impress the trust 11pon 
tlw entire Jttass with wlticlJ the tmst fuud has 
been <~olmlliugled in order to }Jermit tlw reC'larna-
tion of th<o trust fuml. \Ya<ldell \'. Waddell, >Hi 
Utah, 433, 104 P. 74:~. 'rl!e leading ('ase in \vhicl! 
t!Je priueiples applieable to this situation W<'l"L:O 
annoumed is the I'~nglislt case of Ju re I lallct 's 
11~state, 1:3 Law Hep., Chancery Div. ()~)Ci. There 
the rule wm; laid down, which has sinee heeu fol-
lowed with almost uuhrokeu nnifonnit.\', that thl• 
cestui que trust will uot h<o eall<~d upou to identif.\' 
particular money <·.onstituiing his trm;t fund, hut 
that, if tlw trustee has mingled the trn::;t fuwh; 
with his own, the en tire mass is impresse< l with 
the trust to the extent of the amount of the trust 
funds, awl, \\'hen• the trustee has made payments 
from the mingled fund he will he presumed to 
have expended for his own use aud benefit, first, 
his ow11 money, and, lastly, tlte trust fniHl, and 
that the eestui que trust will lle permitted to re-
cover from sul'h mingled fund, awl in prefen'llr"l' 
to conunon <~reditors, the auwunt of molley rep-
reHenting the lowest halam~e to whiell the tniugled 
fund fell from the inception of the trnHt to tlw 
date of iut-lolnmey. rrhere may lw some qualifi-
cations to thi:-; g<'Iwrnl rule, but, so far as this 
(~ase is cow·enwd, the principles stated are ap-
plil'able. 'l'!Je rule is al:-;o stated as follows:" 'l'hL~ 
sm11e rule as to identifying or tracing !he fulllls 
HJ!plies to pub}i(• as to privai<~ fund,;. rrhe mone,Y 
must lw identified or tnwud i11to somu other spe.-
l'ific fund or property. There is a presumption, 
lwwm·er, that what remains at tlte time of insol-
\'euey is a trust fund. The law presumes tltat 
trust fnnds wen~ not appropriated and that a bal-
ance of eash in thl• !Jan<lH of the depository is thu 
trust fuwlH." 22 H. C. L. 2:~1. 
"lu t·HS<' tlt(• miuglud fnud is sufticiC'nt to pay 
!lte trust claimaut iu full, tlw pn•suntptiol! is that 
only the uwney of the trustee lms been expended, 
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but, where the trustee lms l'XJH'Hdc·d, not only his 
own money out of the mingled fnud, but has also 
dipped into and expeudcd pari of the trust fuud, 
Nw trust elaimant will he entitled io recover ollh 
the amomd \\'hich remaim;, all(] hv is eutiilc•d t'o 
rec,over this, ev<'ll though 1 he halaneu is less than 
the total of the trust fund." 
Tooele County Board n. lladloek, 11 I'<H'. 
(2nJ) at pgs. il24 and :l2fl. 
"But aside fr01n i his Yil~w of tlw t•YidPJH'<', 
the elaim to a general eharge upon au.'· aud all 
propel"ty a<-quired by the hoard, through thv u;.;<~ 
of the general funds of the hank with whil'h this 
trust fuliCl bas been blended is not supported h.' 
the weight of antlwrity; uor do the eases dt~eid<~d 
hy this eourt go so far. rrlmi til<· misw.;e of this 
trust fuwl has goiJC to H\H~ll, i11 one~ form or an· 
other the general assets of the hank, is noi enough 
to charge the whole with a lieu, will noi h<• seri~ 
ouslv conte;.;ted. Thl• easl's \Yllich dt'llV sneh :1 
eout.eutioll arc unmerons. To iiii}JI"I's.~ a fntsl 
upon the pmperty of a tort feasor u-lw /i((s used 
the trust fund in his private Clj!"airs it must h(' 
traced iu its original slwpe or sulnditu.fed fonil." 
Cnnvford County \'S. Htraw11, lG7 11'ed. (C. 
C. A.) 1100, 1S L. H. A. (N.H.) 100; 
Schuyler vs. Litilefield, ~:)2 U. N. 707. 
"But we believe tile majori1.'' doet1·inC' i:-o: 
based upo11 soun<l prineiph•s :wd should lK• ad-
hered to. Where uo spef'iiie lieu is <·rented by 
eontract, or acts of 11It' parti<~s, HOJW exists. Tlie 
only eonr:-;e opc•11 to equity is to diseovt•r the cor-
pus of the irnsi fund or io follow th0 ehang·<·s of 
trausmntationi'l of tlw 1 rust lliOJH'\"H into ,;om<• 
particular property or fund t II at c<lll he <"II a rgt•d 
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with tho trust, saving of l'Ourso tho rights of in· 
nocout purchasers for value.'' 
-:\Iyers, Hel·eiver v. Matusek, 9t\ Florida at 
p. 1145, 125 Southom i360. 
"rrhe result of these decisions is that lllereh· 
showing that the trustee has n~cei\'ed trust funds 
will ngt impress a lien upon his assets unless it is 
shown that his asset \Von~ not innensed bv tlw 
misappropriation. But the great weight o'f au-
thority is against this view.'' 
Perry on rrrusts, (7th Eel.) Sec. 83G. 
"'Vhen trust money becomes BO mixed up 
with the trustee's individual funds that it is im-
possible to t raee and identify it aH entering into 
SOme specific property, the trust cea:';eS. rrhe COUrt 
will go as far as it ean in this tracing ancl follow-
ing the trust mouey; but when as a matter of fad, 
it cannot be traced, the eqniiahle right of tlw 
cestui quo trust to follow it failR. Under su('h 
eircmnstanees, if the truioltec~ has bl~come bank-
rupt, tl1e conrt eunnoi say that tl!(• trust money 
is to he found somewlwre in the general estate 
of tho trustee that still remains; he~ ma~· han• 
lost it with prorwrty of his O\Yll; and in such ease 
the eestui que trust can onl.\· coll!e in and share 
with the general ereclitors." 
Little vs. OlwdwiC'k, 131 Mass. 109, ~;~ ~­
K 1005, 7 L. R. A. 370. 
"As a consequence there have been doeisiou:-: 
iu some Ameriean states to tho effect that if onP's 
general estate has been onril·lwd br tho JJI"oc·ec>ds of 
trust propc~rty, the tru:::t may 1w estahlished 
against tho gCI~eral a:-;sets c·vc•n though thu estatl· 
is iusolveut * * But these eases have been 
39 
either expres:,;ly overruled or gn~atly limited al)(l 
qualified. * * * In some states it has heen lwld 
that, ,,·hile it is uot enough to slww tlmt 1lw t l'llt-Jt 
property we11t in to tlw general at-Jsetc;, ii i:-; 
enough to eharge tl1e \\·liol<~ <~state with a trust, 
if it can Lc showu that tlw J!l'ot·ccds l'l'lll<tiut•d 1111-
expewle<l soJnewlwrc in the et-Jtat<•. '' ,,, ·· But b.r 
the great weight of autlwrit~-, a ! ru:-;t t•mmot ))(' 
estahlislled against the procc<~ds of trust pl'Op-
erty, which has heClt disposed of, unlc:-:s t lw pro-
ceeds <'Hit he identified ami tral'ed iuio sonw spc-
eific ftmd or property. '!'his it-1 tl1e do!'triup of ln 
re Hallet's Estate (l:l Ch. Dw. Wu) to \Ylticl1 \YI' 
have already referred.'' 
Lowe v. Jones, Hl:2 ;\] nss., !l4, It-\ N. K ·~:2 
G L. R. A. (N. S.) 487; 
Atkins vs. Atkins, 180 N. K (Mass.) (it:L 
"Before a eestui qne tmst <"<lit dnint spe<·ific 
real or pen;oual property, lH~ mu:.;t sho\N that it 
is tlw irlentical property origimllly eovcred h~ 
the trust or that it is the frni! or product llwn~·of 
in a new form.'' 
Lathrop v. Bamptou, :n Califomia :2:2. 
"To justify a re<·over~- n hencficiar.'· mnst 
he able to follow and identify tlie prop<~rt:v l'itltc•J' 
i11 its original or suhstituted form." 
Oreutt vs. Gould, 117 Cal. :n;), 4~) Pa(·. lHR: 
glizade v. Elizade, 1 :l7 Cal. Gi14, (j(j Pac. 
369; 
IDsta te of Arms, lUH Cal. 334-: 
!Iollaud vs. Bauk of Italy, 1 Pal'. (:lwl) 
1031. 
"It i:,; uot c•uonglt that the K·date of Ll'tnon 
may have heeu indirectly inereHsl'd hy n•Hso!J oi' 
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hit; having Ut\ed the trust fund to pay his own 
debts.'' 
l\lartin Vt\. Smith, ;3;3 Idaho 692, 197 Pae. 
82:). 
"rl'he right of a beneli(·iary to reelaim a trust 
f"ullCI is based upon his right of property, not 
npo11 any right as a preferred ereditor of the 
trustee.'' 
Chat\e & Baker Co. \'. Olmsted, 9:i Wash. 
:i06, 160 Pac. 962; 
lleidclhark v. Campbell, 93 Wash. ()61, Hi4 
Pac. 247. 
"rrlw proof does not definitely trace the pro-
ceeds of the sale of the eoJJvcrtcd property into 
the cash on ham! or into any speeifie assets of the 
bank. Jt merely shows that the proeeeds of these 
securities \Yellt into and swelled tlte assets of the 
bank, nud thereafter they vYere used as all other 
assets in the ordinary operation of the hank. Un-
der sueh circumstanees, the judgment of the court 
was erroneous in impressing a trust on the entire 
assets of the bank." 
Tyler County State Bank v. Shivers, 6 S. 
W. (2nd) (Texas) 108; 
Prior v. Davis, Administrator, J 09 Alabama 
117, 1 ~) South 440; 
i\lattl•r of Cavin vs. Gleason, 105 N. Y. 25ti; 
Maged v. Bank of United States, 2i)4 App. 
Div. (N. Y.) 295, 254 N. Y. Suppl. 569; 
Schneider vs. ~Winchester Developmmtt Co., 
14~) Atlantic (N. :J.) 636; 
Commonwealth vs. Tradesmen's Trust Co., 
D:i Atl. (Pa.) 574; 
0 'Neil vs. Clrvelawl, 22:) ~. \V. (Wiscon-
sin) 82; 
Hainwater \'S. Wildman, 289 S. ¥l. (Arkan-
sas) 488. 
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'l'hc testimony of 1\Lrs. Chase aud .J. H. \\'alhr shows 
without qualification that all cmvloyccs' savings de-
posits, after being iutcnuinglcd and ~onfuscd with t·or-
poratc funds rc('eived fro111 all other sources, were de-
posited iu one or more of the bankiug depositoriL•s ol' 
the ~ompauy. There was no speeial bank aceonnt (o re-
eeive tl1cse employee deposits, and they were ~onsidered 
as part of the general funds of the company for usc in 
its business adivities. 'l'he evidcneu further shows that 
these hank eredits were drawn upon without ref'ermwL• 
to the source of origi11 of the credits. 'I'hc general ob-
ligations ami expense of operation were paid from them, 
ami wlJCn an employee "depositor" desired to "with-
draw" any of his "deposits" they were given a <·llc•C'k 
upon any of the depository banks without regard to thr• 
souree of the funds on credit. (Abs. 41; 'l'nms. 48). 
On the assumption that plai 11 tiff's funds or saving:--: 
wl1e11 paid to the eompany becanw a trust fnll([ aml nut 
<l debt (we have elcarly dernoushated above the eno:· 
of snch a:-;sumptiou) the first step plaintiff is ~ompelled 
to take is to trace these funds from the iutcnuinp;lc•d 
bank aceouuts where they llatl hceu eoufusccl with othei· 
corporation funds. '!'his he U'flparcntly attempted to do 
by testimony of Mrs. Cha:-;e, aml of .T. R \Yalker regard-
iug time eertificatcs of deposit. (Ahs. 75, \Valker Tra11s. 
:J5; Ab:,;. 7G, Walker 'l'rm1s. :Hi and :37; Abs. :27, 'l'nu1s. 
:l4; All:-;. :29, 'l'rans. iHi). lu order to conned tlw em-
ployees' dL•posits wiil1 thest; tillll' r·m·tifi<'ates of deposit 
\\'aJker testified (Abs. 78; \\'alkcr 'l'raus. :l7): 
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A. "\\'ell, we had those spe<·ial deposits 
there to take care of the special accounts and 
o1 her items as 1 s1 a ted before, those special a<'-
<'ounts were the ouly liability we had that was due 
on demand.'' 
~In;. Chase stated (Alm. 29; Trans. 3G) : 
A. 'n"Phis is what I meant by 'emergew·y'; 
\\'e had :,;ome employees that had, say as high as 
ten thousand dollars deposited, if they should 
waut io draw that teu thousalHl out, hut "'e didn't 
have the 11101\ey in our checkin,r; accouut, rw in the 
tilt, we eould draw it out of this emergen<'y ac-
count to pay them, this speeial accouut, if 'We had 
to do that." 
From this and like testimouy it is evident that plain 
tiff is attelllpting to elaim that these time certifieates of 
deposit were a trust fum! to protect the employees' sav-
ing "deposits", hut it should be noted that even 011 
]llaiutiii':,; ow11 evidence this position must fail, because 
(a) Walker in his ow11 testimouy admits 
these time l'ertifieates of deposit were "a reserve 
accrJ11nt to take care of anything ·in an emergency" 
( Abs. 76; Walker rr raus. i3G) awl "we had those 
special deposits there to take eare of the special 
accounts and other items * * * " CAbs. 78; vValker 
Trans. ~7). 
(h) 1lrs. Chase states if "we didn't haz:e 
tltat moHC.IJ in om· checking account or 'tn the till'' 
we eould draw it out of this emergency aeeouut 
to pay them. ( Abs. 29; Tra11s. :3G). 
'l'heso staiemmtis belie ihe claim that the time ecrti-
ficntes of ucposit were a trust fuud soi up to protect the 
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0mployees' savlllg "dl~po::;its", because they n~veal two 
definite fads which iu tlwmselve:,; contradi<·t plaintiff'.-; 
theory: First; Ow time certifiea ie::; were to p roteet "any-
thiuy in au I'IIU'r.fJency"; all(! secondly; "withdra\Yals" 
hy employees were made frmu these time eertificatcs ou[_,. 
if "1ce didn't have that 1nouey in ow· dteekilt,r; accott.JI! 
or i11 the till." llow can it be sue<'essfully claimed that 
the time certificates were a trust fund for tile bmwfil 
of the employee "depositors'' when the:,;e two admissiouc; 
n re made'? 
However, m;ide from the iutrinsie condition of plaiu-
tiff's evideuce, plaintiff must depend upon Mrs. Chase'-; 
testimony given below to show that the employees' saY-
ing funds went into the time certific-ates (.fubs. :31; 'l'ram.;. 
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"Q. You didn't ear mark that tnouey so it 
would go right over to the Contineutal to pay a 
time certifiea te, did you t 
A. No. 
Q. Yon didn't car umrk it ;;o it \\'ould be 1\h. 
Henshaw's to buy a <'Criificate of dl'JWHit, did you! 
A. No. 
Q. But that Wl'IIL into tlw general <Wl'Ount 
indiscriminately? 
A. Yes.'' 
aud also (A hs. ;~5 and ;3(;; 'l'ram. 4:3) : 
"Q. \Ylwt wa;; t lip pr;u·t in• i 11 hn.Yi 11g tll('S(' 
ti11w certifi<·ate;; of' dl•posit, lw\\· ol'tL•n would _,·ou 
buy thcru "? 
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A. I don't remember. 
Q. vVould you do the actual purcha;.;ing of 
them, or would \Valker or Dreyfous, or who at-
tended to that f 
.A. Well, the Manager of the store would tell 
us \Vhen to get them. 
Q. And then you would draw a ehcck on 
your general account t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Depending, one time if the National Cop-
per had a surplus balance, yon would huy the cer-
tificate of deposit at that bank? 
A. Yes." 
'rhis evideuee clearly shows that (a) time certifi-
cates of deposit were purchased from the general bank 
<tccounts of the company and that (b) no certificates were 
purchased whieh represented employees' ''deposits'' ex-
elusively. Jt is left to guesses and surmises as to whether 
or not these tillle eertificates of deposit were purchased 
with plaintiff's funds. 'rhe chances arc equal as to 
whether or not any of his funds \\Tent into the time cer-
Wieate;-;. Certainly there is no positive and direct evi-
dence that sueh was the faet. 'J1he most favorable as-
poet of plaintiff's evidence at this point leaves it to ·t 
matter of conjecture. 
If, howeYer, we accept a pure assumption or gue~:s 
t II at plaintiff's funds went into time certificates, the next 
step in tracing the fund;-; is wholly fatal to plaintiff's 
(·ansc for note :\lrs. Chase';-; cvidmH•e: (Ahs. :37; 'rrans. 
44): 
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"(l. You want ~-our evidmwe to :-;taud tlta1 
at ihe time the receiver was appointed, there \YCI"l' 
no time certificates 1 
A. No, none then.'' 
ami ab;o (Ails. :37; '!'ram;. 44). 
''Q. 
tmwe at 
A. 
But you know tltere \H~re uoJw m e:-us-
that time'? 
N' ot at the time of t l1e ret'eiver.'' 
lt IS therefore plain thai prior to tlte date the re-
ceiver was appointed, tlwsc certifi<"atcs of deposit had 
been cashed and the proeceds used ju the trausac~tiou of 
the company business. Ce1·twinly no time certificate,,· 
came into the hands of the receiver. Thus cuds plain-
tiff's trust fund search. He can go no further ill hi;.; 
proof. 
Under the authorities cited above aud iu aecordam•t• 
with the Utah rule, plaiutiff must trace his money into 
some specific fund or property, aud ''\\'here the origiual 
trust property or trust fulld call uo longer he~ traced or 
identified eitl1er in its original or suhstituted form'' the 
trust fails ami plaintiff stands m; a general creditor. He 
mmnot elaim a lieu ou tlw geueral assc•t s of tlw ('Orpora-
tioll, for the Utah Supreme Comt lim; expressly and em-
phatically adopted the majorit_y rulu whi('h refuses to c•x-
teud the priuei pl e of tracing truK t fnud,; heyowl its 
logical st·opc. 'l'he evidem·c~ shows iha t (a) Plain--
tiff\.:; funds were• intt~rmi11glt~d all(! <'onfnsed with 
111L~ iucollle from all othc~r som·(·es and thus (•oufmwd \H'I't' 
depm;ited in one or more of the eompany hanks; (b) that 
it may be only conjectured that all or some part of plain-
tiff's funds were usetl to purchase time certificates of 
deposit, <llld (c) all time certificates were cashed and 
usl~d in the eompany business and none reached the lmnd::: 
of the receiver. 
Under the rule mmonnced in Utah in the Kent easl' 
(~mpra) and Tooele Bank ease (supra) (and which is the 
majority rule), plaintiff has failed to trace any of his 
funds into property or assets of the receivership estate, 
but l'Onira has shown that if the funds found their wav 
into the time eertifin<te::; of deposit, all sneh eertifieates 
had been cashed and the proceeds expended prior to the 
appointmeut of the receiver. Renee, the so-called "trust 
fnn<l '' failed ~when the means of tracing it failed. His 
right to follo·w his alleged "trust funds" failell wit II 
proof that none of the certificates of deposit real'hell 
the reeeiver's hands. The certifieates were the end of 
his trail. He made no proof that any of hi::; fuucls were 
a part of the assets of the company w hieh the reeei ver 
reeeived. His proof was directed towards the certi-
ficates of deposit and when his trail ran blinll be canum 
110\Y retrace his steps in the direction of the general as-
sets of the eompany and claim a preferred lien thereon 
because he has no claim on the general assets (other th<lll 
that of n eornmon creditor) upon his failure to idcn ti f\ 
his alleged "trust funds" either in its original or tran;.;-
muted form. 
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From the foreg•oing discu(-;sio11 Ow following con-
elu::-;ions are logical: 
I. 
'l'he plaintiff Renshaw all(l his assiguor, May Nalis-
bury, were at all times common ('!'editors of Walker 
Brothers Dry Goods Company. 'l'hne was 110 fidueinry 
relationship between them aml the <·ompany. 1'liCy in-
tended the company to use thei1· funds in the 001Hlud. ol' 
its business and in return re<'ei n~ eom pens at ion in the 
form of interest. 
II. 
If the funds paid by plaintiff and M.iss :Salisbury to 
the eompany were trnst fuwls, tlwy became so inter-
mingled ami confused with other funds of' the compally 
that their identity has been lost and plaintiff failed to 
tracP them into any property or assets <~~oming into the 
hands of the receiver; hence lw will be relegate<! to the 
position of common creditor. 
lt i::-; submitted that the judgnwnt in this <'ase al-
lowing plaintiff a preferenee, should he reversed, with 
iu::-;trudions to the trial court to enter judgment decn•e-
iug· him and his as::-;ignor to he common cnxlitors without 
preference. 
Hespectfully snblllitted, 
Rl'I'ER & COWAN, 
\VIIA::;oN AlcCAH'l'll Y, 
"1 ttonteys for lJefnulrtJd 
and ~1ppellant. 
